THERESA WERNER: (Sounds gavel.) Good afternoon, and welcome to the National Press Club. My name is Theresa Werner, and I am the 105th president of the National Press Club. We are the world’s leading professional organization for journalists, committed to our profession’s future through our programming and events such as this, while fostering a free press worldwide. For more information about the National Press Club, please visit our website at www.press.org. To donate to programs offered to the public through our National Press Club Journalism Institute, please visit www.press.org/institute.

On behalf of our members worldwide, I’d like to welcome our speaker and those of you attending today’s event. Our head table includes guests of our speaker as well as working journalists who are Club members. And, if you do hear applause from our audience, we’d note that members of the general public are attending. So it’s not necessarily evidence of a lack of journalistic objectivity.

I’d also like to welcome our C-SPAN and our Public Radio audiences. Our luncheons are also featured on our member-produced weekly Podcast from the National Press Club, available on iTunes. You can also follow the action on Twitter using the hashtag #NPCLunch. After our guest speech concludes, we’ll have a Q & A. And I will ask as many questions as time permits.

Now I would like to introduce our head table. And I would ask each of you to stand up briefly as your name is announced. From your right, John Seidenberg, editor for


[applause]

Admiral Jonathan Greenert grew up in the Pittsburgh suburb of Butler, Pennsylvania. The son of a steelworker, he was the third of six children. Admiral Greenert was the all-American kid growing up. He worked not one paper route, but two. He was on the swim team, student council, a member of the National Honors Society, and the Archery Club. And, to top it all off, he and his buddies were also members of the maître d’ club, a group that offered them a way to earn a few bucks, either by selling hot dogs at a ballgame, or waiting on folks at Rotary Club dinners.

Accepted at the University of Pennsylvania, the Military Academy of West Point, and the United States Naval Academy, Greenert made the smart choice of following in his footsteps of his uncle and chose the Naval Academy. There he studied nuclear power to serve as a submarine officer. So let’s open the Naval Academy’s yearbook from 1975, and you’ll find a few tidbits about Admiral Greenert. It describes him as an “Always colorful and almost religiously non-academic midshipman, known for colorful weekends.” It concludes with, “His personality, good looks, and quick wit, he is bound to be a success.” Coming from a Navy family, I know how clairvoyant yearbooks can be.

Admiral Greenert has successfully commanded at all levels, including the USS Honolulu, where he earned Vice-Admiral Stockdale Award for Inspirational Leadership. He has also served as Commander, Submarine Squadron 11, Commander, Naval Forces Marianas, Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command.

He most recently served as the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Greenert is a decorated member of the Navy, having been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal six times, and the Legion of Merit Award four times. He is the 30th Chief of Naval Operations. Please welcome Admiral Jonathan Greenert to the National Press Club.

[applause]
JONATHAN GREENERT: Ladies and gentlemen, I can assure you, you won't find all of those words in my biography. I really do not know where Theresa got-- well actually I know where she must have got it. I thought all that was embargoed. [laughter] But thank you very much, Theresa.

I am very honored and privileged to be here today, ladies and gentlemen. And I would like to give a big shout out to the pastry chef who made these cupcakes. Now I’m about to burst into tears, because the logo on my cupcake was my last fleet command until I became a bureaucrat. This is very sad in a strange way, but also very inspiring. And I want to thank you very much.

It’s been 14 months in the job here. And it’s everything they promised me as I’ve been in this job. An amazing group of sailors, civilians and their families. That always impressed me. Always wanting to do more and work for something bigger than themselves. And I’ve been honored to lead and serve them.

Again, thank you for the invitation. I’d like to talk about two things today, and then take some questions. One, our position, what I call our position report, today, in the Navy and since my time as the Chief of Naval Operations, and our rebalance to the Asia Pacific, a very important initiative as we work to comply with our defense strategic guidance.

Our position. When I started the job, again, 14 months ago, and I looked out there, what is this going to be like here in the future, what’s the sea out there, what’s the channel look like, I saw the budget control act. I saw the Arab Spring going on around us. Operations during Freedom Afghanistan and the changes taking place there. And a new defense strategy probably on the horizon.

And I said, “You know, I want to make sure that our folks in the Navy, from the ward room to the boardroom to the ready room for aviators, are focusing on the things that are really important.” And I broke it down into kind of what I’ll call three tenets, or a lens, the way to look through things. And I brought these out, and they’re still applicable today.

Number one, war fighting has to be first. It has to be in our minds all the time. That is what we are put together to do. That is why this nation created a Navy, to be sure that we can assure security and, if necessary, win the war. And everybody, all of our folks are essential in that regard. War fighting is our primary responsibility.

Number two, we need to operate forward. Our Navy is at its best when it is out and about. And that has been our heritage. It’s been our legacy, our tradition through the years, as we celebrated the 200th commemoration of the War of 1812 during this past year, and are still doing it today. Operating forward means using innovative ways to make sure that the ships that we have are where we need them to be. And it’s not just about necessarily how many ships we have, but how many ships we have forward.
And third, be ready. Be ready means more than just parts, more than maintenance, more than fuel. It also means that we have confidence and proficient crews that are ready to do the job and get that job done. So those tenets that I just laid out to you, those six words remain applicable today and are key to how we view things in our leadership in the Navy.

Our force today, if you look-- I’ve passed out some chartlets there for you to help you follow along, to make some points here. We have about 50,000 sailors out today, deployed on about 110 ships that are deployed around the world. And on the little chartlet here, where it says Today’s Navy, you will see where in the world they are. You will notice that about half of the ships that we deploy forward are in the Asia Pacific region. And it’s been that way for about 10 years, now. We’ve had somewhere between 45 and 50 ships forward deployed in the Asia Pacific.

Now about half of those ships deployed in the Asia Pacific are there all the time. They are called the Forward Deployed Naval Force. And we get great leverage having the Forward Deployed Naval Force. Number one, they're there all the time. Two, they build relationships and assure allies. And three, a little factoid, to keep one ship forward from the continental United States requires four total ships. One is there, forward deployed. One has just come back. One is about ready to go forward, and in this process. Or one is in deep maintenance. So, if we can leverage to operate our ships forward, to keep them forward, then we get a good return on investment.

If you’ll notice, about a third of our deployed ships are in the Middle East in the Arabian Gulf. And about a dozen–plus are in, actually today, about 18 ships are in the Mediterranean, due to the issues that we have in the Mediterranean.

The key here for me, as you look here, you’ll see little kind of valve signs, if you will, at what I call the Maritime Crossroads, the Straits of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Gibraltar, and, of course, the Panama Canal. We have to have access, be at or have access to those places. Those are the Maritime Crossroads. That’s where the life blood of our world economy travels through. And that’s what we need to be able to maintain and sustain to the world as one of our primary jobs.

So we develop also and nurture places. And you’ll notice there are little squares, places like Diego Garcia, like Singapore, Yokosuka, Japan, Atsugi, Japan. Djibouti, and Camp Lemmonier at Djibouti, Rota, Spain. These are places. They're not our bases, they are places where allies allow us to go and to refresh, to resupply, to increase our logistics. And, if you look around there, these are important places for us to continue our mission as we look out there in the future. And in my view, they are very important to our ability to continue to execute the defense strategic guidance.

You will notice lastly, that there is a little box on the lower left. And it lays out for you how long it takes to get from the east coast or the west coast to, say, the Suez Canal, to the Strait of Hormuz. And it’s several days. In fact, in some cases, it’s two or three
weeks. If we’re not forward and ready to get the job done, then it is going to take some time. So again, operating forward is important.

Now I mentioned that recently, I published a position report. In the Navy, when you are out at sea, once a day you prepare for the Captain what we call the eight o’clock report that’s usually done in the morning, or the 12 o’clock report if you choose to do it at noon. It’s the position report. It’s a fix. And it says, “Here was our voyage today, Captain. Here is where we are.” And some things may have occurred. We may have been set off of our course due to wind, due to current. And I published this position report to kind of lay out for the Navy where we are after my first year on the job.

We have been set a little bit, if you will, on some emergent challenges since I’ve taken the job. And we have to adjust our course a little bit. Some things that have emerged since I’ve taken the watch, that we have to focus on right now, in the near term. One, sexual assaults. I am troubled that we haven’t moved forward to limit and really reverse the trend of these events during my time here. For me, sexual assault is a safety issue. Our sailors, as they serve, of all genders, everybody, deserves a safe place to work. And it’s a safety and readiness issue for me. We need to focus on it. We have a strategy. We are moving out on it. And it will receive my attention, my full attention over this next year. We have to treat it as a crime because that’s what it is.

Next, suicides. We have had, I am concerned, on a creeping kind of increase in the number of suicides that we’ve had in the Navy. We measure it by number of suicides per 100,000 so that we have a consistent measurement. And regrettably, a few years ago we had about 13 suicides per 100,000. Now it’s 15 per 100,000. So we’re creeping up. And we have to address it. We have to empower our sailors to be able to deal with stress. We have to look out for each other. And we have to imbue and embed that in all of our shipmates, to make sure that, if somebody is reaching out, we’re ready to take care of them.

Third, up tempo has been a little higher than I expected at this time a year ago. We are operating higher than planned. And we need to reconcile how we can continue to support that. Right now, we are committed to providing two carrier strike groups in the Arabian Gulf through March. We’ve been doing this since 2010. And we’re committed to do that, as I said, through this March. We need to take a look at that, and we will be, with the Joint Staff and the service, to see do we need to continue this? What do we need to do to adjust our training if necessary, our industrial base, and our maintenance processes, to be sure that we can respond if necessary.

We need to look at our up tempo from the perspective of our people. We call that individual tempo, I-tempo, which is the measurement of what each sailor’s requirements are going to see, coming back, and then rotating out, as opposed to the unit. And I think it’s important for the health of our force that we continue to do that.

And lastly, manning at sea. Our manning, over all, is acceptable. And I'm satisfied with that. But the leadership skills in certain billets on certain positions on certain ships
has to be adjusted to make sure we get that right. So that, as we respond to the increased up tempo, we’ve got the right leadership in the right place at the right time. And we’ll pursue that.

During this past year, I have done some studies and found that there’s a few initiatives that I may not have thought about a year ago, but they’re important. We want to make the electronic magnetic spectrum and cyber a primary war fighting domain. We need to-- We’ll be accelerating our efforts in this regard. And it goes something like this. I had some folks take a look and say, what frequencies are we using in the electronic magnetic spectrum? How much energy are we putting on out there? Are people measuring it? And, do we know what we need to know about that?

And the answer was, you know, we did a pretty good job of this at one time, during the cold war. Some of you may remember a mission control. And that was a consistent effort that we had. But not so much now, because frankly, we just haven’t had to do that.

So we need to do what I guess I would call take care of our electromagnetic hygiene, to know how much energy we’re putting out there, that is being picked up, if you will. How much-- At what frequency band? Why do we use the frequencies we do? Can we hop frequency as we build new systems? Because it’ll be important, because a lot of our potential adversaries and a lot of new systems are coming in that measure exactly that, our missions. So electronic magnetic spectrum is important.

We need to sustain the undersea-- our dominance in the undersea domain. And that’s continuing a network approach. It is important to have submarines. They are a main part of dominance in the undersea domain. But it’s also a matter of having systems. It’s PA aircraft with sonar boys. It’s surface ships with appropriate sonars and towed arrays. It’s fixed systems on the bottom. And it’s unmanned underwater vehicles that can be autonomous. And we’re not far from being able to deploy just all those systems.

And we’ll continue to develop in field an integrated, unmanned aerial system to operate from a carrier. This next year, here in fiscal year 13, we’ll do a demonstration of an unmanned vehicle from a carrier and recover, that we’ll be able to use that system. That will lead us to building a system that we can operate within our air wings, and provide that persistence, maybe support, logistics. Because if you don’t have all the systems that support the pilot, that’s weight, extra weight, extra payload, extra systems, extra capability. And that will be an important part of our future.

A few words about our rebalance to the Asia Pacific. In our defense strategic guidance, which was released just about a year ago, it was clear to us that we needed to rebalance, if you will. We were directed to rebalance to the Asia Pacific, while sustaining appropriate capability in the Middle East. It’s been a long-- The Asia Pacific has been a longtime focus for the U.S. Navy. Five of our seven treaty allies are in the Pacific. Six of the top G-20 economies, and the largest Armies in the world, are in the Asia Pacific. So it makes sense that we would do that.
As I have shown you, or mentioned on our graphic there, 50, about half--50 ships, about half of what we deploy annually, are in the Asia Pacific. And a half of those are home ported there. So an important area. Typically, we measure, when we make changes and we rebalance, we measure it by ships. But I’ll tell you, ladies and gentlemen, it’s more than ships. It’s really about capability. And there's much more to this rebalance than ships.

How will we rebalance? Four ways. One, it will be force structure. It will be ships. And, if you look on your chartlet, you’ll see the tomorrow picture, if you will, the Navy tomorrow. And you will see a listing from fiscal year 13 to 17 to 20, how we will migrate, how we will evolve our ship counts to the Asia Pacific and to the Arabian Gulf and other areas around the world.

Now, how do we--if you will, it’s not creating ships. Again, it’s operating forward in innovative ways that make sense. We’ll have new ships coming in, the Littoral Combat Ship, which will deploy and operate forward. And we’ll rotate the crews. That will free up some of our larger surface combatants, our destroyers, to be able to deploy elsewhere.

We will bring on what’s called the Joint High Speed Vessel, a catamaran, high speed, 30-plus knots, 35-plus knots, with a helo deck, to take care of some of the missions that we have amphibious ships doing today, say in the southern command and African command and the European command, again, freeing up amphibious ships to deploy elsewhere.

We will bring on what’s called the Float Forward Staging Base, an auxiliary like ship--actually built from the basics of a tanker, and the centerpiece put in so that you can ballast up and down. And with that, fuel, a flight deck, and an opportunity to employ a lot of rotary wings to bring comfort to HADR, do perhaps special operating forces. And we’re bringing the Float Forward Staging Base in. Again, that will free up amphibious ships to do other jobs in other parts of the world. So, as we bring on perhaps ships that will likely resonate with some of the missions we need around the world, we’ll be able to redeploy and redistribute our forces around the world, our ships, and rebalance to the Asia Pacific.

I’ll tell you, a key to this is a recent initiative where the government of Spain offered us the opportunity to forward deploy, put the ships and families into Rota, Spain. Four of our Aegis class DDGs, top notch ballistic missile defense capability for the defense of Europe. As I mentioned before, they will be there in theatre. And remember what it takes, four to one. We have four there all the time. So we will effectively free up, all told, six ships to redeploy elsewhere that we would normally sit in Europe. So, more presence to the Asia Pacific through force structure. That’s number one.

Two, we will base more ships and aircraft on the west coast. As our ships retire through the remainder portion of this decade, we will replace them on the west coast such
that, by 2020, we will have 60 percent of our ships on the west coast or the Pacific home ported, and 40 percent on the east coast. Today it’s 55 percent west coast, 45 percent east coast. So that’s number two.

And number three, we’re fielding new capabilities in our rebalance to the Asia Pacific. Guided by the air-sea battle concept of operations, we will increase capabilities in the undersea, as I mentioned before, distributed systems, autonomous underwater vehicles. We will also bring on a network to undersea capability to connect and cover larger, broader areas. We will bring in the P-8, which is a replacement for our P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, vastly increasing ASW coverage in the undersea domain.

In the surface area, capability-wise, we will bring improvements in our anti-ship/cruise missile capability to be able to detect, further out, cruise missiles and be able to, therefore, engage them further out. Anti-ship ballistic missiles to counter that capability, we’ll have that in our surface capability there in the Western Pacific. And, in air, we’ll have improved air-to-air. We’re bringing in the Joint Strike Fighter. She will deploy to the Western Pacific first. And with her will be an improved weaponry, improved radar, to extend our range.

And lastly, number four, in our rebalance we’ll be developing partnerships and what I call a rebalance of intellectual capital. We’ll expand and mature our alliances in the Western Pacific. And we’ve got a foot up on that today. As we speak, in Japan, our folks, our operations folks at the Seventh Fleet and at the Commander in Chief Self-Defense Fleet for Japan, are co-located in the operations area for certain operations.

In Korea, the same exists. We are co-located with our brothers and sisters in the Republic of Korea Navy. In Singapore, the Singapore government and military have offered us a site where we can operate joint task exercises, do humanitarian assistance disaster relief operations there in Changi, in Singapore, using the port and a facility there. So our partnerships are maturing. Our partnerships are growing in the Western Pacific.

We do 600 events, from staff talks to major exercises in the Western Pacific. And we do 170 ship-to-ship exercises a year. We will continue to mature those and work those up. Intellectually and strategically, at our War College, as we bring our students on, we will be focusing more on the Western Pacific as a benchmark. We have to, again, again, retain our capability as needed in the Arabian Gulf, and what is needed there. But our focus, our benchmark, will remain and will be the Western Pacific.

And we will sharpen our focus and the capabilities needed in the Western Pacific, looking at doctrine, looking at what is needed in the future for systems, for R&D, for science and technology. The benchmark will be that which is needed in the Western Pacific. So there's really a whole panoply of means by which we will rebalance. Ships are important, and they are a good measure. But there's so much more, as we look toward the future, and we meet the requirements of our defense strategic guidance in this regard.
So, having laid that out, I commend that to you as our future, and how we see things today, as we prepare our budget for fiscal year 14, is to support just this very effort that I mentioned to you. I think we’re on track and prepared to meet our national security commitments in this regard and the defense strategic guidance. Thank you very much. And I’ll look forward to your questions.

[applause]

THERESA WERNER: Your article in foreign policy speaks of balancing the force. How do international navies play into your strategy?

JONATHAN GREENERT: The international navies play into the strategy, really by mission, I think, and by alliances that we’ve had. And let me speak to the alliance. I just spoke to the Western Pacific. The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force plays-- We cooperate with them to share what we call long-range search and track missions in the Western Pacific. The navies of the Republic of Korea have shown an interest to continue to do that in a similar manner. So alliances that we have, we’re taking those, and we’re evolving the missions that we may want to cover in that regard to do that.

With regard to counter piracy, right now in the Gulf of Aden, alliances play a major, major part. We have a coalition maritime force. It’s called 151 in the Gulf of Aden, which has been led by Pakistan. It’s been led by Bahrain. Actually, the Iranian Navy takes part, not in the coalition, they are operating with us, but in that area. The Chinese operate in that area. The Russians operate in that area. Not necessarily in a coalition, but in the sense of with alliances we share this. But also, it brings together an international community that has a common concern.

THERESA WERNER: As tensions between China and Japan over their claims on the Senkakus increase, how concerned are you about the possibility that a miscalculation by either side might lead to heightened conflict?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, if were to pick a word to describe the concern, it is exactly that. It is a miscalculation, causing escalation. I think the key here is a common set of protocols to deal with interactions in that area. I’ve spoken about this with my counterpart in the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, with the Singapore Navy, and the Philippines. And we all agree that what we need are a consistent set of protocols, laying out very clearly where we stand. Freedom of navigation in international waters. A consistent set of protocols about how we describe that and discuss that with any two-- any navies in that area.

With regard to China in that regard, I believe we need to continue the dialogue and build upon the dialogue that we have today. We have a system or a series of talks that are sponsored by the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, agreement reached years ago, where a group of O-6’s from the Chinese Navy and the U.S. Navy sit down
and discuss common set of agenda items. That has been expanded to a plenary session, where now flag officers, junior admirals sit down and discuss that.

We in the Department of Defense have, now, a deliberate strategy for engagement with the Chinese military. And I think it’s important, Theresa, that we continue on that, again, to be sure and clear where we stand, and then we can work on the issues at hand.

THERESA WERNER: What is the biggest challenge presented by China’s growing naval strength?

JONATHAN GREENERT: I think the biggest challenge is understanding the intent, understanding the strategy that China intends to unveil, if you will, in that regard. They're making great headway in surface ships. They’re making great headway in tactical aircraft. And it appears they have a definite interest in improving their submarine technology. But I think that the biggest challenge for us will be to continue the dialogue and to learn how to operate together in a cooperative manner in areas that are important for freedom of the seas, areas that are important for economic development, both in the Western Pacific, and if they choose to expand operations, as they have, like I mentioned, the Gulf of Aden, for the common good, if you will, and security in all the oceans.

THERESA WERNER: You speak of maturing alliances in the Western Pacific. Can you talk further about the movement of Marines from Okinawa to Guam, Australia and Hawaii?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, I can speak to— That’s really probably better suited for the Commandant. But it is clear that the footprint of Marines in the Western Pacific is changing, and is going to change. That lay down is described and will evolve from Okinawa toward Guam and also NAD, in a rotational deployment aspect, to Australia. Our job will be to provide the maritime lift for Marines who will rotationally deploy to Darwin, Australia.

Today, there are about 250 Marines exercising with the Australians. That will grow. It would double and grow until toward the end of the decade. And by 2020, we’ll have a Marine expeditionary unit sized, about 2,500 rotationally deploying there. Our job will be to bring an amphibious ready group to bear at that time, to provide the lift, and provide them the means, working together, to operate in the Southeast Asia region.

THERESA WERNER: How close are the Chinese to our Navy base nuclear capabilities? And should the U.S. be worried?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, the Chinese do have nuclear submarines today. I would say that it’s very difficult bringing on a nuclear program. We certainly learned that throughout the years. I would say vigilant is where I would say is the right term. Worried is not quite yet. I am very confident in our ability to operate wherever we need to in the undersea domain.
THERESA WERNER: Can the U.S. Navy build and maintain the fleet required by the pivot to the Pacific?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Today, in the defense strategic guidance, there are a set of attributes, a set of missions that we are required to bring forward. This is all underwritten by what we call the global force management allocation plan. It is really my covenant with our global combatant commanders to what we need to provide worldwide. And I am comfortable, today, that today and that, in the future, as shown by the chartlets that I’ve seen here, as we evolve to operate forward, using the innovative means and with the current shipbuilding plan, that we can meet the requirements of the defense strategic guidance.

THERESA WERNER: Will the U.S. return to old bases in places such as the Philippines?

JONATHAN GREENERT: That’s a good question that is under deliberation and consultation right now with the Philippine government. Today we operate from-- some of you remember Clark Air Base, Clark Air Force Base at one time. And we fly with Philippine armed forces on what we call maritime domain awareness flights, with RP-3s. They have crew members onboard. We do this about once a month.

We still make port calls to Manila. We just-- George Washington was there not that long ago, as was the Eisenhower. I believe it was. We had a nuclear carrier visit there. And we somewhat routinely make port calls there. But I think, to return to a base requires a series of deliberations, if you will, that we have to work out, status of forces agreement, which is expired, would have to be renegotiated. And it would require a long-term commitment. But those are under discussion.

THERESA WERNER: Can you elaborate on how the Law of the Sea Treaty would assist you or impact you with respect to ongoing confrontations in the China Sea?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Yes. I think-- Well, I'm a proponent. I support Law of the Sea Treaty. And particularly in the case of the South China Sea and its area, it would give us a document, a reference to continue these, as I mentioned before, dialogue that we have with the Chinese Navy and with the Chinese military, a reference that would clearly articulate things like what international exclusive economic zones, how they are laid out, territorial seas, how they are laid out, freedom of navigation, and what those protocols are. And that we could, then, continue the dialogue, using, again, a common document both nations have signed up to and ratified.

We've already seen some examples of countries, Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam, and the Philippines worked out, using the Law of the Sea Treaty, the means to determine territorial-- and resolved, in some cases, territorial disputes in there, or at least clearly lay them down so then you can have a trail and a path to further deliberations, to solve it.
THERESA WERNER: The first mobile landing platform has been assigned to central command. Will future MLPs be assigned to Pacific command? And what are the merits of such prepositioning?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, the precise assignments for the mobile landing platform are not complete yet. I will tell you, it will certainly deploy to the Pacific command. Because what it brings, the mobile landing platform-- again, remember, as I described it, it’s a former tanker. The engine room and the hull shape is a large tanker. But then the insert, instead of tanks, is space, volume, that you can ballast down, that you could then bring landing air cushion craft onboard, that you could bring small boats up to.

So it’s volume, it’s persistence, it’s major fuel, and maintenance support that you can bring to bear for a long time at various places around the world. We see African command and southern command and some elements of central command to be key, as you mentioned, Theresa, already we’re seeing the payback in the central command for the float forward staging base.

THERESA WERNER: The carrier Eisenhower, one of four deployed carriers, is on a nine-month deployment. Given the Iraq/Iran/Afghanistan situation, and the new emphasis on the Western Pacific Theater, when do you expect carriers to get back to a six-month deployment?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, I don’t think six-month deployments are in the future for, I would say, the next two or three years, at least. And the reason is twofold. One, the requirements for deployment around the world, as we see it, the global force management allocation plan that we’ve signed up to. Secondarily, we need 11 carriers to do the job. That’s been pretty clearly written. And it’s underwritten in our defense strategic guidance. We have 10 carriers today, as the Eisenhower returned from her last deployment just a week ago. And she is getting ready to decommission.

The Ford will come into being and commissioned around 2015. And we hope to get her on deployment about a year-plus later. So, as we migrate from 10 toward 11 carriers, our real requirement, we’re looking at probably closer to, on the norm, about a seven-month deployment to seven months and a week for our carriers.

Each of our ship classes have a different level, if you will, of notional deployment. Some folks kind of group it together on the carriers that that’s what all of our ships do. But six months remains notional for our submarines. Six months remains notional for some of our maritime patrol aircraft crews and some of our other classes of ships. But seven months is more notional, I think in the-- for a notional skill, if you will, or a notional term for our carriers in the future.

THERESA WERNER: With the current carrier up tempo, and cost and time to build a new carrier, why didn’t the Navy extend the Enterprise for another five years?
JONATHAN GREENERT: Why did they?

THERESA WERNER: Why didn’t they?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Why didn’t we. Enterprise is almost 51 years old. And anything from the cabling was degrading, just the insulation on the cabling that was so old. Her reactor plant was built for so many years of operation. And so, after numerous and very, very close and comprehensive evaluation, from the reactor plant, to the propulsion plant, to the auxiliaries, to the flight deck, I think you get the point. She was tired. And it was time for the Enterprise to complete her service.

THERESA WERNER: The Littoral combat ships are requiring more shore-based maintenance than originally planned. Is this sustainable?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, the Littoral combat ship is still a program that is coming into its being. We have, really, one ship, the Freedom, who has been operating in somewhat of a routine. She does require a bit of maintenance. And we’re learning a great deal about what exact maintenance scheme we will want, what will be the balance of using what we call organic or, you might say, typical Navy means of doing maintenance today, versus using a contractor for maintenance.

And so, as we speak today, I have-- I stood up a literal combat ship council. And I placed a senior three-star Admiral in charge, Admiral Hunt, who used to be-- he commanded the-- he was the tight commander, if you will, the surface force commander. Knows a lot about the Littoral combat ship. And, what we want to do is get in place, very quickly, what kind of planned maintenance does the ship need? What will be its maintenance plan? What will be the maintenance scheme? How much do we operate it? Do we have the manning about right? And he has a pretty high level group and comprehensive group looking at this so we can respond and bring that class in like it needs to be brought in. Because it’ll be a very, very important part of our future.

THERESA WERNER: The GAO in a September 21st, 2012 report, said that the Navy’s training and maintenance plans were vulnerable. What is your reaction?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Our training and maintenance plans will always need review. I don’t know what-- I’d have to understand the context, and I’m not familiar with the context to that specific report. But we are constantly reviewing better ways to do maintenance, better ways to do training. Particularly in our surface fleet, we have done a very big round-turn, a study in what are the maintenance requirements on our surface ships, our amphibious ships, destroyers, our cruisers, patrol craft, my encounter measure ships, in order to assure that all of those ships will reach their expected service life, and we get what the American public should get for the cost of the ship.

THERESA WERNER: Why are men and women at the Naval Academy wearing the same covers? And, are you planning to move it from the Academy to the whole fleet?
JONATHAN GREENERT: Interesting question. We have a pilot. And it was-- The uniforms are designed to be as uniform as they can be, as it makes sense. So what we have in place is merely a pilot, so that, again, the folks-- the male and female uniform, to see if the same hat makes sense. And we’re using the Naval Academy merely as a pilot.

THERESA WERNER: Can we get an update of NAVFIT98?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, I’m afraid you won’t get it at this forum. But NAVFIT98, that’s a good question. And I think I’ll have to take that back and I’ll send you a report on that.

THERESA WERNER: What’s the future role of the carrier?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Well, the carrier, I wrote an article a while back, that was called-- as I was looking at platforms and how platforms have evolved, how we buy things and put so much money into them, and how well do they evolve. And, are we getting our money’s worth. And, if one looks at the Enterprise, when she was built over 50 years ago, the type of aircraft that she used, the type of-- She had vacuum tubes in her radars, you know, for many of you, what is a vacuum tube? Well, she just completed deployment, where she employed the most cutting-edge strike fire that she have. She had the cutting-edge radar. And she was the-- the ship on the point, supporting operations in Afghanistan, supporting for our troops.

And so I think the future of the carrier is, it has volume. It has persistence, being nuclear power. It certainly has speed. It certainly has the ability to employ a whole panoply and myriad of aircraft. And I spoke earlier about bringing unmanned aircraft to the carrier. So I think it’s almost the imagination can expand on what we can do with the aircraft carrier, given it has persistence, speed, volume, and tremendous capability today.

THERESA WERNER: If we need less ships, will they be replaced with smarter ones?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Smarter ships in the context-- if it is the context of reduced manning and more efficient fuel and better sensors, yes. We will definitely. Will we need less ships? We should think of the number of ships that we need based on what capability the ship brings, for what mission, and at what parts of the world, and for what portions of the future, and what threat it may deal with. I think that’s a better evaluation.

But one cannot make any mistakes that you need a certain number of ships. As I say, quantity does have a quality of its own. And, as I’ve shown on my handout here, it’s not just the number of ships, it’s the number of ships forward, and what type, and what capability for what mission in around the world.
THERESA WERNER:  How has the force structure changed over the past year? And, can you give us your thoughts on ship-building today and in the future?

JONATHAN GREENERT:  Well, in the past year, we started the year at 285 ships. And we’ve grown to 287 ships. Now there hasn’t been only a change of two. That’s the net change. The good news is, we have-- the last six ships that we have commissioned, that we have accepted in the Navy from industry, have been under-budget or on budget. And it has been ahead of time or on contract time. And that includes two nuclear submarines. It includes an auxiliary. It includes an Arleigh Burke destroyer. It includes a Littoral combat ship. So I think maybe you can see many different classes of ships.

We are the recipients, most recently, on what can happen when you have a predictable stabilized ship-building budget. Industry has the opportunity to make a profit and to reinvest that, if you will, to hone their skills with their labor force, because they have a predictable labor force. And a lot of that is on us, to make sure that I bring, and that my staff brings forward, requirements that makes sense, and that we can sit down.

And, where it makes sense, do a multi-year procurement that is buy things in an economic quantity.

And this past year has been a reflection of what can happen, as we’ve grown and gotten things on time, or early, and on budget or early. And quality, where the builder’s trials have gone quite well with our ships.

THERESA WERNER:  How have female mariners performed so far? And, is the Navy happy with that performance?

JONATHAN GREENERT:  Yeah. In a word, I would say exceptional performance. The anecdotal feedback, if you will, and the consistent feedback, is that the females that have integrated-- where they're integrating is on our SSBNs, our ballistic missile submarines down in King’s Bay, Georgia. They have gone on patrol, now, at least three crews. And that would be 12 per ship on deployment. They stand watch. They stand watch very well.

A measure of a junior officer’s skill and performance is, who is chosen to be the engineering officer of the watch, when you have an inspection, when you return from patrol? And on two of these ships, one of these women were selected to do that. And I think that’s a pretty good reflection of their dedication, the ability to integrate quite well with the crew, and the ability of the crew to support. So this is going quite well. And I think we will continue in a similar manner on a nice trajectory.

THERESA WERNER:  More than 20 commanding officers have been relieved this year. What does the Navy intend to do to remedy this high rate of firings?

JONATHAN GREENERT:  Yes. I’ll tell you, when one thinks about how we-- why we are replacing commanding officers, there are four basic categories as to why a
commanding officer has tended to fail. One, a grounding or an untoward incident, grounding or a collision. Two, regrettably, just incompetence, not cut out to be a commanding officer. Three, unable to deal, perhaps, with the stress. And one might become abusive, overbearing. And then four, misbehavior, such as a DUI, an adulterous affair, or something of that nature.

And, by a factor of at least two to one, as you look at these 20, it’s been misbehavior. And so, I don’t understand why they are misbehaving. And I am concerned about that. And I’m looking into that, looking into it very hard. What we need to do, and what we’ve been doing in this regard, is one, evaluate our performance in being able to develop and nurture our commanding officers. And we did that in 2004 with a Navy IG review that took place. We did it again in 2010. And we are implementing the findings in the 2010 report that we had out there. And so, you’ve got to, I think, evaluate that.

Number two, we’re re-baselining. And what I mean by that is, or I should say baselining, making sure that our track, the way we nurture our officers as we bring them along, the way we screen them for command, it’s consistent across the Navy, whether you fly, whether you’re on surface ships, submarines, whether you’re a Seabee, or whether you’re an information dominance corps, that there is a consistency to the screening process and the evaluation process, so that we see that we’re taking into account those matters. And that we’re also developing the character of our officers, as they grow up, and they inherit, actually, more stress, more responsibility. That’s important.

Lastly, we want to shape them. We want to take what we learn from these reports and embed that in our leadership continuum, and shape our officers to make sure that the character that they have is the character of the commanding officer that the American people deserve. In the end, as to get command of any Navy unit, it’s unique, and it’s unlike any other command in the Department of Defense.

And I am a firm believer in what we call the Charge of Command. That this individual has a unique responsibility, has unique authority, and therefore has the accountability that they owe the people of the country.

**THERESA WERNER:** How will the Petraeus-Allen scandal affect the Navy’s officer selection process and training methods?

**JONATHAN GREENERT:** Well, I don’t think it’ll affect the officer training selection process. I can’t imagine. I would have to give that some great thought. But we have been introspective as a result of the events in the past week. We, the service chiefs, looking at it ourselves, and talking with the chairman. And we’re going to have a tank, what we call tank. It’s a meeting of the service chiefs with the chairman and the vice-chairman, next week. And sit down and talk about what are the attributes, what took place here? What matters? What are the facts involved with this? How do we view ethics and accountability and behavior? And where might there be weaknesses, as we look across our four-star ranks in our respective services in the joint community?
And then, look internally to be sure that our flag and general officers, we are leading them properly. And, as I just mentioned on commanding officer character and behavior, are we developing character right? Are we assuring that we’re looking at ourselves as closely as we would want to look at our subordinates? And bringing that all together.

**THERESA WERNER:** Should adultery that does not involve a senior-subordinate relationship still be punishable by the UCMJ?

**JONATHAN GREENERT:** Well today, I will choose not to question the UCMJ. It is the UCMJ. And so I think it is-- I don’t think, I know it is my responsibility to carry it out.

**THERESA WERNER:** The military has been on the forefront of social change over the years, such as race and gender equality, expectation that persons on the job be drug and alcohol free, and most lately, gay rights. Can you anticipate in which way the military will, again, lead the way in social justice in the future?

**JONATHAN GREENERT:** Well to me, the subject is diversity. And to me, we have to have a diverse force. And it’s all about survival. We must go mine where the talent is. We have to have the talent. And that involves, if you will, ethnic diversity. It involves gender diversity. It involves sort of geographical diversity. Kids from all around the country, and what they bring in their unique area. And professional diversity. Some folks brought together with a different view. It’s good for the institution.

To me, we’ve got to get the recruiting right. We’ve got to go out and, as I said, go mine those skills and bring them in. Today, about one out of four folks in high school qualify to be recruited into the Navy, only one out of four. And so you can try and picture that in the future. I can't tell you that’s going to expand or get less. But that’s our challenge.

So I think we’ve got to recruit properly. And then we’ve got to develop those that we recruit. And, if it’s somebody that may be-- if not a minority, somebody that isn't used to doing what we do in the maritime forces, encourage them to see that they can do this. If somebody wants to fly, you can fly, you know. Give it a try. If a woman wants to have a family and have a Navy career, it has been done. We have great role models to see that that can be done, etcetera.

And then, I am working very hard-- and I think it’s important that our leadership understand that diversity has to be sort of institutionalized. It has to be kind of a second nature aspect when you go out to hire, when you go out to recruit and pull people in. You got to think diversity, because you bring diversity, you bring great value.

**THERESA WERNER:** The Secretary of State and Defense have visited Vietnam. How important is Vietnam to the U.S. strategy? And will you visit?
**JONATHAN GREENERT:** I hope to visit Vietnam. I'm going to the Asia Pacific next year. And that is one of the places that I hope to visit. Vietnam is key. Geography is important. They have offered the ability, or at least to talk about maybe perhaps opening-- increasing the number of port visits. We do a port visit in Vietnam, I can't say exactly how many times a year Pacific command kind of coordinates that. But it’s happening with our ships.

We are increasing cooperative opportunity. They have joined some exercises, particularly in search and rescue. And, like I said before, some of the maritime security aspects that are so important. So there is an opportunity here. And it will be a matter of moving forward, I think at a rate that we need to do to respect their sovereignty and respect where they stand in their security matters.

**THERESA WERNER:** What does downsizing of the Navy mean for global security, as well as our allies, that count on us for an added layer of security?

**JONATHAN GREENERT:** Well, as you look on the chartlet that I gave you, we will grow the Navy from roughly 287 today to 295 ships by 2020. Downsizing may refer to personnel. And frankly, we’re not downsizing. We are growing over the years in the number of personnel. So one, the ship count is going up. And the number of people are going up.

Frankly, we did some efficiency methods recently in about the 2005-2006. And we cut too many people out of some areas that we thought we could. And we’re restoring that from billets at sea to some maintenance billets ashore, roughly 2,000 here, so that we have a nice, rich seashore rotation, so kids can develop their skills ashore, and then return back to sea that much better.

**THERESA WERNER:** What’s your sense of whether the Iranians would shut down the Strait of Hormuz, giving the crippling sanctions the west has imposed, and that 80 percent of Iran’s revenue comes from oil?

**JONATHAN GREENERT:** Well, it’s difficult to say whether the Iranians will attempt to shut down the Strait of Hormuz. I am confident that we have the capability to open the Straits of Hormuz, should they be, if you will, shut down. We have made some great strides in counter-mine warfare over the past year, due to some reprogrammings we did, increase in emphasis on the skill.

And, in fact, just a few months ago we did an international mine exercise. And it was a pretty good success. We were able to test new technology, autonomous underwater vehicles for finding mines and neutralizing mines. We brought an international coalition together. We hoped to get about 20 countries there. We had 35 countries take part in this exercise. Twenty of them brought ships or helicopters or other means.
We used the float forward staging base that we mentioned before as, if you will, the flagship, the command ship for the coalition operations. And so we learned a great deal. We learned that there is a lot of synergy that we can bring together. We learned that unmanned underwater vehicles do work for counter-mining. And that you don’t need a mine countermeasure ship, and a large helicopter dragging a sled to clear these things out, to be effective. That, in fact, smaller ships that some nations with smaller navies, can bring to bear in this and become very, very effective participants in the mission.

THERESA WERNER: We are almost out of time. But before we get to the last question, I have a couple of housekeeping matters to take care of. First of all, I’d like to remind you about our upcoming Luncheon speakers. On December 18th, Leon Panetta, Secretary of U.S. Department of Defense will be speaking here. Secondly, I would like to present our guest with our traditional National Press Club coffee mug and our version of the challenge [00:57:55]

JONATHAN GREENERT: Oh, thank you very much.

[applause]

THERESA WERNER: And my last question: What is your prediction for the Army/Navy game? And, do you have a wager with your Army counterpart?

JONATHAN GREENERT: Yes. Well, I think we’ll win by a field goal. There’s something about the Army/Navy game and a field goal. And I use that, because I think it’ll be close. You may or may not know that we defeated Air Force earlier this fall. [applause] And Army defeated Air Force. So this is for all the marbles, the Commander in Chief Trophy. This is a big deal. Yeah, General Ordierno and I have made a wager. It’s the same as last year. The loser wears the jersey of the winning team and poses for a picture in front of the team. So, needless to say, I have a great shot of Ray Ordierno in a Navy jersey with 75 on it from last year’s game. [laughter]

[applause]

THERESA WERNER: Guess he better find it again for this year.

[applause]

THERESA WERNER: Thank you for coming today. I’d also like to thank our National Press Club staff, including its Journalism Institute and Broadcast Center, for organizing today’s event. Finally, here is a reminder that you can find more information about the National Press Club on our website. Also, if you would like to get a copy of today’s program, please check out our website at www.press.org. Thank you. And we are adjourned.

[gavel]
[applause]

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